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Abstract 
This report looks at employment rates of immigrants and systematically compares them 
with employment rates of natives. The first finding is that employment gaps vary 
substantially across Member States, and that for some these gaps are persistent in the 
period considered (2008-2015). In addition, there is little evidence of overall convergence 
between Member States in the reduction of these gaps over this period. Having looked at 
the trends in employment rates since 2008, this report then turns to the likely reasons for 
the gaps. By drawing on the academic and policy literature, it singles out some of the most 
likely determinants of these gaps and unpacks them according to their relationships with 
length of residency, country of origin, education, and skills. Finally, the last section 
provides a brief overview of the evolution of these gaps in the context of Member States’ 
active labour market policies. The last section outlines the main findings.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Participation in labour markets is one of most widely used indicators of the effectiveness 
of immigrant integration policies. In this perspective, one way of measuring whether 
immigrants managed to effectively integrate into European societies is to look at their 
employment in Member State labour markets. The more immigrants have employment 
rates that are close to or equal to the ones of natives, the more they are considered as 
effectively integrated. This has been an explicit policy priority at the EU level since the 
Tampere European Council in 1999 when the EU undertook to ‘ensure fair treatment of 
third country nationals who reside legally on the territory of its Member States. A more 
vigorous integration policy should aim at granting migrants rights and obligations 
comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non-discrimination in economic, 
social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia’1. The Council 
of the European Union reaffirmed the importance of this indicator in its principles on 
‘immigrant integration policy in the European Union’, stating that ‘Employment is a key 
part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigrants, to the 
contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions 
visible’ (Council of the European Union 2004: 17). Trends in employment rates are now 
part of the European Semester coordination which, by including the EU2020 goals, now 
features a specific monitoring of the employment targets, namely ‘75% of people aged 
20–64 to be in work’2. Based on EU Labour Force Survey data3, this report looks at 
employment rates of immigrants – defined both as individuals born outside the EU or with 
the nationality of a non-EU country – and systematically compares them with natives’ 
employment rates.  
 
As non-negligible corollaries, the closer migrants’ employment rates are to the ones of 
natives, the more significant is the socio-economic contribution that migrants can give 
both to destination states and to their origin countries through remittances and transfer 
of skills. In addition, the public perception of migrants as an active part of the social fabric, 
contributing to the sustainability of public finances, is important for the social acceptance 
of migrants in European countries (Finotelli 2009). 
The main findings are the following:  
 We can identify clusters of countries with similar employment gaps between 
natives and immigrant throughout our analysis. 
 There are substantial differences in integration outcomes across regions of 
birth/citizenship of immigrants, even when controlling for education, and these 
differences persist through time. 
 There are also significant differences between recent- and long-term 
immigrants, highlighting the importance of the length of residence for 
immigrant integration. 
 Overall, the larger the gaps regarding the length of education between natives 
and immigrants, the higher the employment gap. However, there are several 
exceptions that need further analysis.  
 Regarding skills, countries with higher gaps between natives and immigrants’ 
skills also feature large employment gaps. 
Having looked at the trends in employment rates since 2008, this report then turns to the 
likely reasons for the gaps based on descriptive analyses. By drawing on the academic and 
policy literature, this report singles out some of the most likely determinants of these gaps 
                                           
1 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (accessed on 04/10/2017).  
2 https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester/framework/europe-2020-strategy_en (accessed on 
04/10/2017). 
3 As a general note, and unless otherwise specified, data is drawn from the EU Labour Force Surveys Data 
limitation issues are reported under each figure.  
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and unpacks them according to their relationships with length of residency (Luik et al. 
2016; Panel on the Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration et al. 2017; 
European Commission and OECD 2016; Bratsberg et al. 2017), country of origin (Hatton 
2014; Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010; Khoudja and Platt 2017), education (Chiswick and 
Miller 2015; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2017; Algan et al. 2010; OECD 2017), skills 
(Fulop et al. 2016; Kerr and Kerr 2011; Lupiañez et al. 2015; Himmler and Jackle 2014), 
and policies (Levels et al. 2017; Migali 2017; Butschek and Walter 2014).  
 
Migrants’ employment: academic and policy view on the topic 
There is an established consensus in the literature that the convergence of migrants’ and 
natives’ labour market outcomes appears to be stronger in terms of employment rates 
while at the same time weaker in terms of wages (Hatton 2014: 43).  
Looking at employment outcomes across Europe, Chiswick and Miller (2015: 1325) found 
that in Central and Northern countries immigrants reported much lower probability of being 
employed than natives (8 to 15% percentage points lower), whereas in Mediterranean 
countries, Ireland, and UK, the gap was smaller, between 0 and 6 percentage points. 
Regarding children with foreign-born parents, the picture is fragmented across the Member 
States. In fact, there are studies that reported convergence of employment rates between 
natives and immigrants’ descendants in the cases of France, Spain, and immigrant women 
in UK, as well as studies that have highlighted the difficulties of immigrant communities 
to catch up with the native counterparts (e.g. Germany, and immigrant men in UK). 
In addition to the level of employment, another key factor of labour market integration of 
migrants lies in their polarization into specific occupation niches as compared to natives. 
Evidence shows that both EU and non-EU immigrants tend to work in jobs with lower skills 
requirements than natives in the majority of EU countries, and particularly so in Italy and 
Spain (Chiswick and Miller 2015: 1328). This finding is supported by other studies that 
point out that in EU-15 immigrants are more likely to being employed in low skilled, low 
paid and highly unstable jobs than natives (Natale and Grubanov-Boskovic 2017). Another 
way of capturing immigrants’ employment quality is provided by the overqualifation rate 
measured by Eurostat. In 2014, the overqualification rate was very similar for natives and 
the second generation of non-EU immigrants at about 22%, a bit lower for the second 
generation of mobile EU citizens (slightly less than 20%), and stood at approximately 35% 
of first generation immigrants born both within and outside the EU (Eurostat 2017: 88–
89). 
Differences in migrant categories also affect the mechanisms of labour market integration. 
Bakker et al. (2017) posit a ‘refugee entry effect’ because of the ‘lack of resources, rights 
and security about the future’ this category faces. This ‘effect’ would materialise in lower 
labour participation rates as compared to migrants entered through other categories like 
family or labour (Bakker et al. 2017). The authors find, in the case of the Netherlands, 
that even a decade after gaining access to the country, the refugee group displayed lower 
labour integration than family and labour migrants although the gap significantly 
decreases through time. Dustmann et al. (2017) also provided the evidence that refugees 
are by far the worst off in employment chances, as compared to natives, other EU citizens, 
and non-EU immigrants (Dustmann et al. 2017: 522). In a recent contribution focusing on 
Switzerland, Hainmueller et al. found that longer waiting times during the asylum 
assessment phase translate in lower employment rates for recognised refugees, in the 
range of 16 to 23% less than the average rates (Hainmueller et al. 2016). An EU study4 
based on the 2014 LFS ad hoc module highlighted large disparities in employment rates 
between different migration categories, as well as showing that such differences are 
eliminated only over the medium- to long-term (more than 20 years) between those 
entering for ‘employment or study’ and the ones admitted through ‘family’ or as ‘refugees’ 
                                           
4 For other recent analysis of refugees’ labour market integration, see the 2016 Employment and Social 
Development in Europe 2016 (European Commission 2016a) 
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(European Commission 2016b: 20; European Commission and OECD 2016: 5–6, 17–18, 
20–25). 
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2 Trends in employment 
rates 
2.1 Evolution of the 
employment by country of 
destination 
The overview of the trends in 
employment rate differentials5 between 
natives and immigrants6 is presented 
according to OECD classification of 
European countries into different 
categories on the basis of their migration 
histories, main type of migration, and 
education levels (OECD and EU 2015: 27–
32). The underlying idea is that a one-
size-fits-all approach for the entire EU 
might be unsuitable in integration policy, 
and a more tailored analysis grounded in 
the Member States’ peculiarities is more 
suitable to deal with different integration 
challenges. The OECD identified eight 
groups of countries in its study, seven of 
which include EU countries:  
a. Long-standing destinations with 
many recent and highly educated 
migrants (Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
the United States) 
b. Long-standing destinations with 
many settled low-educated 
migrants (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, the 
Netherlands) 
c. Destination countries with 
significant recent and 
humanitarian migration 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden) 
d. New destination countries with 
many recent, low educated 
migrants (Greece, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain) 
e. New destination countries with 
many recent highly-educated 
immigrants (Cyprus, Iceland, 
Ireland, Malta) 
                                           
5 We would like to point out that trends in employment rate gaps are determined by changes in the employment 
rates of both natives and immigrants. For a recent overview of not only trends in the performance of both 
natives and immigrants in European labour markets, but also how the very presence and inflows of 
immigrants might influence the labour market performance of natives, see D’Amuri and Peri (2014). 
6 Unless otherwise specified, the age groups considered for this report is 15-64, thus coinciding with the cohort 
analysed by OECD/EU (2015).  
The OECD investigated the mechanisms through 
which naturalisation could have a measurable direct 
impact on immigrants’ labour market integration. 
The OECD hypothesised  five such mechanisms:1) 
a reduction in labour market barriers; 2) 
administrative costs borne by employers; 3) 
naturalisation as a signalling device to employers of 
observed and unobserved immigrants’ skills and 
capacities; 4) increased investment in human 
capital to achieve or following the acquisition of 
citizenship; 5) other indirect channels (OECD 2011: 
45–46).  
Peters et al. (2017) have recently investigated the 
so-called ‘citizenship premium’ in the Netherlands. 
The common assumption in the literature is that 
immigrants who naturalise enjoy a citizenship 
premium as employers are keener in rewarding 
immigrants who go through the naturalisation 
process as signal of positive integration (‘positive 
signalling’). Peters et al. (2017) argue that more 
than an ex post reward to the acquisition of 
citizenship, higher employment rates might be the 
result of the human capital investment occurred in 
the run up to the acquisition. In fact, their ‘results 
suggest that these investments result in an 
accelerated integration trajectory that already 
bears fruit in the labour market prior to 
naturalisation’.  
Bakker et al. (2017) provide evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that patterns of acquisition of 
citizenship might differ according to the channels of 
entry. They found that while 89% of asylum seekers 
entered between 1995 and 1999 eventually gained 
Dutch citizenship, 70% of those entered through 
family reunification did so (a much bigger channel), 
and only 20% of labour migrants acquired the 
citizenship of the host country. Recent studies have 
highlighted that immigrants who resided for 10 
years or more and took up citizenship of the host 
country had a substantially higher employment 
rate, namely 67% for those entered through family 
reunification (as compared to 50%) and 67% for 
those recognised as refugees (as compared to 
55%)(European Commission 2016a, 121). 
In a recent case study focusing on Switzerland, 
Hainmueller et al. found ‘the integration returns to 
naturalization are larger for more marginalized 
immigrant groups and when naturalization occurs 
earlier, rather than later in the residency period’ 
(Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Pietrantuono 2017). 
In other words, ‘naturalisation has important 
independent effects in accelerating political 
integration and helps turning immigrants into 
“citizens”’ (Hainmueller, Hangartner, and 
Pietrantuono 2015, 12656). 
CITIZENSHIP & LABOUR MARKET 
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f. Countries with an immigrant population 
shaped by border changes and/or by 
national minorities (Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia) 
g. Emerging destination countries with small 
immigrant populations (Bulgaria, Chile, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico, Romania, Turkey) 
We excluded group ‘g’ because of low reliability 
of data. We then merged group ‘d’ and ‘e’ into a 
distinct group ‘new destination’, and ‘a’ and ‘b’ 
into another labelled ‘long-standing’, to simplify 
comparisons. Our final sample is thus grouped 
into 4 categories: ‘new destination countries’, 
‘long-standing destination’; ‘humanitarian 
migration countries’; and ‘immigration shaped by 
border changes/minorities’. Adopting such a 
classification allows us to cluster countries which 
have similar features and hence get a simplified 
comparison between these subsets rather than 
between 28 countries.  
An immediate differentiation needs to be 
introduced between immigrants defined as 
foreign nationals (country of citizenship criterion, 
CoC) or based on the country of birth (CoB).  
 Under the CoB criterion, the category of 
migrants includes all individuals that are 
born outside EU 28, and can thus include 
both individuals that are third-country 
nationals as well as those holding EU 28 
nationality.  
 Under the CoC criterion, the category of 
migrants includes individuals that hold 
only a non-EU nationality – it includes 
mainly non-EU born but also EU-
born/native persons. Therefore, under the 
CoC criterion, when an immigrant 
acquires a citizenship of a EU Member 
States is no longer part of the migrant 
category. 
Comparing the trends for these two groups – 
natives and immigrants, – we observe larger 
gaps under the citizenship criteria (Figures 1 and 
2). The likely reason for this is that, under the 
citizenship criteria, we are already excluding 
those who have already taken a significant integration step by acquiring the citizenship of 
the host country7. In contrast, in the case of CoB criterion, the immigrant group include 
                                           
7 As always in social sciences, while there is consensus that integration through naturalisation brings about better 
labour market integration outcomes for immigrants, such consensus is not unanimous. For instance, 
Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) do not observe any significant effect of holding the citizenship of the 
destination countries in occupational outcomes. Drydakis (2017) also finds that an ethnic background 
regardless of one’s nationality is the factor generating the unequal access to the labour market.  
Immigrants’ employment chances are 
more sensitive to economic cycles than 
natives’ (Chiswick and Miller 2015, 1332). 
The lesser educated among immigrants 
are those who endure the harshest 
consequences in downturn phases, as well 
as immigrants from non-OECD countries. 
By surveying the existing literature on the 
relationships between economic crisis and 
migration, Green and Winters develop the 
expectations that 'migrations are likely to 
be affected more severely the be 
recession than native workers', as they 
'often have less secure job contracts, they 
are more likely to be temporary or part-
time, they are over-represented in less-
skilled occupations and immigrant-owned 
businesses are more likely to go bankrupt' 
(Green and Winters 2010: 1063, 1068). 
Dustman et al. have analysed the 
consequences of downturns on 
immigrants labour integration outcomes 
in Germany and the UK between the 
1980s and 2000s (Dustmann, Glitz, and 
Vogel 2010). First, they observe that 
controlling for age, education, and 
regional location reduces only part of the 
gap between natives and immigrants – i.e. 
some of the gap is due to compositional 
factors. However, most of distance 
between the two groups is left 
unexplained by those factors. Second, 
while employment rates for immigrants 
show a ‘somewhat more pronounced 
cyclicality’ as compared to natives, 
especially when coming from non-OECD 
countries, this does not apply to earnings, 
where ‘there is not much evidence for 
cyclical differentials either in Germany or 
the UK’ (Dustmann, Glitz, and Vogel 2010, 
6, 7). When skills-related controls are 
introduced, the authors still observe 
‘larger unemployment responses to 
economic shocks for immigrants relative 
to natives within skill groups’, especially 
for non-OECD immigrants, but the same 
does not apply to wages (Dustmann, Glitz, 
and Vogel 2010, 14).  
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both integrated and less integrated migrants, lowering the gaps as a consequence. Such 
larger gaps under the CoC criterion can be consistently observed whenever a comparison 
is drawn between the two criteria in this report8. Because of the constant outflow from the 
TCNs group under the CoC criterion to the 'nationals of the reporting country' after a 
certain number of years of residence occurring through naturalisation9, TCNs tend to have 
lower length of residence in the host country. According to our calculation on LFS data, 
the share of migrants residing 5 years or less as compared to the total number of 
immigrants were, under the citizenship criterion, 20.84%, whereas under the country of 
birth criterion it was 13.56%. A second element to bear in mind is that not all countries 
provide data based on both criteria, as for instance Germany only provides data on non-
EU nationals. 
For each of the two figures below (1 and 2), we calculate the average gaps for each of the 
four groups identified in the OECD-EU study. In the Annex, we spell out in more detail the 
trends for all countries pertaining to each group (Annex Fig. 24-25).  
Looking at each group of countries, we can notice: 
- Humanitarian migration: first, the gap for this group of countries (3 countries) is 
positive (meaning that natives have higher employment rates than immigrants), 
and the highest among all groups of countries under both criteria. Second, there 
is a relative stability of the gap, except for a drop in 2009, largely led by a 
reduction of the gap in Finland and Denmark. This finding is largely consistent 
across the two criteria of CoB and CoC. Third, the period 2008-2010 inverted a 
reduction in gaps undergoing in previous years. Indeed, all the panels showing 
trends in averages point to the importance of 2008-2010 global financial and 
economic crisis10 as a watershed in employment rate gaps (OECD and EU 2015: 
301).  
- Long-standing destination: first, this set of countries (7 Member States) displays 
the second highest positive gap on average. Second, the trend is remarkably 
stable in the period considered for all Member States except Luxembourg, 
reflecting enduring gap at the state level (see Annex Figures 24-25). Third, again 
there was a downward trend occurring until 2010, reversed by the crisis.  
- Immigration shaped by border changes/minorities: first, the most crowded group 
of countries (9 countries11) features negative gaps according to the CoB 
criterion (meaning that natives have lower employment rates than immigrants), 
whereas under the citizenship criterion there is a slight positive gap. The 
positive results for the citizenship criterion is largely driven by Croatia (see Annex 
Figures 24-25) but several other countries also display positive gaps. Second, 
countries show significant fluctuations in the period considered, bearing in mind 
the limited sample size of immigrants for some of the countries. Third, there is no 
discernible pattern related to the crisis at group level.  
- New destination countries: first, this group (7 countries) displays a negative gap 
for most of the period under the CoB criterion (except 2013), and negative until 
2011 under the citizenship criterion. The inclusion of Ireland drives up the gap 
under the citizenship criterion. Second, similarly to the former group, there are 
large fluctuations across time. Third, there is evidence that the crisis reduced 
and then turned slightly positive the gaps between natives and immigrants.  
                                           
8 For a more extensive treatment of this topics, see OECD (2011). 
9 Eurostat informed us that the 'naturalisation rate' was 2.6% in 2014. The naturalisation rate is the ratio between 
the foreign citizens who acquired the citizenship of the host country out of the total foreign population. Such 
rate varies widely across EU member states (Eurostat 2017: 53).  
10 On the impact of the 2007/08 economic and financial crisis on migration see, inter alia, (Green and Winters 
2010; Dustmann et al. 2010; Chiswick and Miller 2015; Roos and Zaun 2016). 
11 It should be noted that these countries also have comparatively low non-nationals in their resident population 
(Eurostat 2017: 14). 
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Figure 1. Trends in Employment Rate Gaps, CoB Criterion, 2006-2016 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of Eurostat data, 2017. 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Germany and Malta under CoB criterion. 
 
Figure 2. Trends in Employment Rate Gaps, CoC Criterion, 2006-2016 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of Eurostat data, 2017. 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Malta under CoC criterion. 
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2.2 Evolution of the employment by 
country of birth and citizenship 
To further our understanding of the employment 
trends of natives and immigrants, we offer an 
overview of employment rates broken down by groups 
of countries of birth and citizenship.  
The figure 3 reports the average employment rate by 
countries of birth and citizenship at the EU level. Due 
to EU LFS data limitations related to aggregation, it is 
possible to identify only the region of birth and 
citizenship of immigrants and not the single countries. 
Consequently, in the following figures we provide 
information on 6 groups (East and South Asia, Europe 
outside EU28, Latin America, North Africa and the 
Middle East, North America and Australia, Other 
Africa). 
The thick dark blue bars represent the rates in 2015, 
while the thin pale blue bars the ones back in 2008. 
Currently only immigrants from North America and 
Australia have higher employment levels than natives. 
Conversely, the group which has performed worst in 
the labour market is formed by immigrants from the 
region of North Africa and the Middle East. With the 
exceptions of natives and Eastern and Southern Asian 
immigrants, all other immigrants have experienced a 
reduction in their employment rates between 2008 
and 2015, with the steepest one being recorded for 
immigrants from Latin America (approximately a 10 
percentage points less). The depth of such reduction 
shows the extent to which immigrants have not 
recovered yet from the 2007/09 economic crisis, 
contrary to the native population which does not show 
substantial differences in the employment rate in 
2008 and 2015.  
Subsequent sections12 will explore the level of association between countries of 
birth/nationalities and educational levels, hence providing a more refined picture. 
However, we would like to immediately point out how differentiating along countries of 
origin provides useful and valuable information on immigrants' employment across Europe.  
                                           
12 Section 3.2. 
A consistent finding across the 
literature is that the immigrants’ 
performance in labour markets in 
terms of wages or employment 
tends to vary according to the 
country of origin, even when the 
educational level of immigrant is 
considered. According to 
Fleischmann and Dronkers (2010) 
the mechanism behind this 
relationship is linked to the level of 
‘visibility’ and ‘acceptability’ of the 
country origin of the migrant in the 
destination country. Hatton (2014) 
adds also that specific 
characteristics of country of origin, 
such as stability, poverty and 
political freedom affect migrant 
integration outcomes. Further, 
cultural effects associated with 
countries of origin may also exercise 
a significant role in the determining 
labour market integration outcomes. 
This is particularly evident in the 
case of employment rate for women, 
which tends to vary significantly 
depending on the country of origin 
(for a recent case study on the UK, 
see Khoudja and Platt 2017) 
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Figure 3. Employment Rates by CoB and CoC, 2008 and 2015 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Germany and Malta under CoB criterion. The sample does not 
contain data on Malta under CoC criterion. 
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3 Drivers of the gap 
Over the past decades, academic and policy studies 
have highlighted the role of several potential 
determinants for the gaps that we exposed in the 
section above. In the remainder of this paper we will 
briefly look at some of these determinants and 
describe how they enable us to better understand 
the relationships between employment rate gaps 
and length of residence, education and skills, and 
country of birth/citizenship. It is important to bear 
in mind that our analyses are purely descriptive and 
therefore are expressing simple relations and not 
effects. More advanced econometric techniques 
would be needed to evaluate effects while 
controlling for household and individual 
demographic and economic characteristics. 
References to studies providing such more advanced 
econometric analyses are provided in the boxes.  
3.1 Length of residence  
Figure 4 plots the employment rates of natives in 24 
EU Member States as blue bars, and rates of 
immigrants in red and yellow dots for those who 
respectively stayed in the country less or more than 
5 years, respectively13. We chose the 5-years 
benchmark because, besides being in line with other 
analysis of immigrants’ labour market integration, is 
a reference to the Long Term Resident Directive14, 
which states ‘Member States shall grant long-term 
resident status to third-country nationals who have 
resided legally and continuously within its territory 
for five years immediately prior to the submission of 
the relevant application’, and ‘determines [long-
term residents’] rights and the areas where they 
enjoy equal treatment with EU citizens’15. On the 
basis of EU LFS data, the OECD calculated that, in 
2012/13, 21.6% of third-country nationals 
immigrants aged 15-64 had resided in the host 
country for less than 5 years16, 25% between 5 and 
9 years, while 46.8% for more than 10 years (OECD 
and EU 2015: 305). More recently, Eurostat has 
provided information according to which by the end 
of 2015 there were approximately 7.7 million non-
EU citizens who were long-term residents (Eurostat 
2017: 54).  
The available literature would posit that immigrants should improve their employment 
status as the years of residence in the host country increase. Graphically, this would 
translate in yellow dots distancing themselves from red ones, and getting closer to blue 
bar levels – which would mean that immigrants acquire the same employment level as 
natives. In 2015 (Figure 4, right hand side panel), this was true for several countries: The 
                                           
13 It should be borne in mind that our sample population is 15-64, while the EU2020 is calculated on the 20-64 
cohort.  
14 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32003L0109  
15 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/LSU/?uri=CELEX:32003L0109  
16 For the sake of completeness, 6.8% were born in the country.  
The academic literature suggests that 
the length of residence is closely 
associated with immigrants’ 
employment rates. Drawing on 
Census data for the US, a recent study 
confirmed that after ‘an initial period 
of adjustment’ in which immigrants’ 
employment lag behind that of 
natives, immigrants tend to gradually 
catch up with ‘their native-born age-
peers’ (Panel on the Economic and 
Fiscal Consequences of Immigration 
et al. 2017, 104).  
Luik et al. found that, in case of 
Sweden, ‘years since migration 
explain at least 70 % of the 
employment gap among all’ migrant 
categories (2016: 16). Indeed, wider 
European cross‐sectional evidence 
confirms the reduction of the gap with 
the increasing number of years of 
residence in the hosting country 
(Dustmann et al., 2017; European 
Commission and OECD 2016) 
This mechanism is not, however, 
confirmed in the Norwegian case 
where longitudinal data showed that 
‘After five to ten years of residence, 
virtually all immigrant groups from 
low‐income countries – regardless of 
gender and admission class – 
experience declining employment 
rates’ (Bratsberg et al. 2017, 29) 
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Netherlands, Sweden, the UK, Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia, France, 
Belgium, Portugal, Ireland, Romania, Spain, Italy, and Greece. For few countries, the 
opposite pattern emerged as immigrants worsened their situation the longer they stayed 
in the country (Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, and Cyprus).  
Comparing these rates between 2015 and 200817 helps understand the impact of the crisis 
on Member States. What can be observed in Figure 4 is that for some countries (e.g. Italy, 
Spain), the reduction of employment rates for both groups of immigrants – i.e. recent 
immigrants (<5 years) and long-term residents (>5 years) – occurred in the context of 
falling rates also for natives (though to a lower extent). For other countries (e.g. Sweden, 
Austria, the UK), the drop in immigrant employment rates occurred in the context of 
relatively stable rates for natives. Missing under the CoB criterion, Germany saw a 
substantial improvement between 2008 and 2015 of the situation of the immigrants 
residing 5 years or more, from approximately 55% to 60%, in line with the strong 
resilience of the German labour market during the crisis (Figure 5). 
Comparing the employment rates under the two criteria, we can observe that, for example, 
in the Netherlands in 2008 under the CoB criterion (Figure 4, left hand panel), the long-
term residents had employment rates more than 10 percentage points higher than recent 
immigrants. On the other hand, under the citizenship criterion the difference between the 
two is less than three percentage points. We can suppose that what is driving up the 
difference between the long-term and recent immigrants under the CoB criterion as 
compared to the CoC criterion is those immigrants who vanished from the statistics under 
the latter criterion, namely those who naturalised. If this is correct, this means that long-
term immigrants who did not naturalise barely saw their employment rates increase as 
compared to recent immigrants, as shown in Figure 5. To a varying extent, we can identify 
a similar trend in 2008 in Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Slovenia, and in 2015 in Finland, 
France, and Sweden. On the other hand, some countries see the counter-intuitive trend 
where recent immigrants reported higher employment rates than long-term immigrants, 
such as Cyprus and Hungary. To explain this latter outcome, other factors should be taken 
into account such as education level, country of origin, skills, structure of the labour 
market and economy in these destination countries (see next sections for more details on 
these factors). 
All this is important to bear in mind when analysing Figures 6 and 7, which represent the 
net balance in employment rate gaps for recent immigrants versus natives and long-term 
immigrants versus natives, across EU Member States. Figures 6 and 7 show that only a 
limited number of countries have reduced the gap in employment rates between natives 
and immigrants (negative bars on the left) between 2008 and 2015, while in most of 
countries the employment gaps have increased. Again, looking at these figures one has to 
consider that a reduction in the gaps might be the result of both immigrants improving 
their employment situation, but also of natives worsening their rates.  
If we then compare recent and long-term immigrants under the CoB criterion (Figure 6), 
the first element to be noted is the amplitude of the gaps, which is generally lower for 
long-term immigrants. This means that long-term migrants tended to have a more stable 
position in the labour market as compared to larger fluctuations for more recently arrived, 
especially considering that this occurred in the context of the biggest crisis since the Great 
Depression. This might be the result of the enhanced rights granted to long-term resident 
by EU legislation, but further studies need to be carried out to ascertain such relation18. 
This shows that improvements towards closing the gaps for these two sets of immigrants 
have been largely uneven across Member States. 
Finally, if we further break employment rates by length of residence and region of 
birth/citizenship (Figures 8 and 9), we can see that, as expected, recent immigrant from 
                                           
17 Depicted in the left-hand panel.  
18 A conceivable way for testing this hypothesis would be to consider also MIPEX score for the ‘security of 
permanent residency’, with the expectation that the gaps either narrow or stay close to 0 the stronger is the 
security of permanent residence.  
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all regions of birth/citizenship have lower employment rates than long-term immigrants. 
In 2015, the lowest employment attainment was recorded for recent immigrants coming 
from the North Africa and the Middle East region (thick dark blue bars), who have also 
witnessed a significant worsening of their situation from 2008 (thin pale blue bars). Similar 
to the aggregate figures analysed before (Figure 3), the steepest decline in employment 
rates occurred for recent immigrants from Latin America. Focusing on long-term residents, 
Eastern and Southern Asian immigrants are the only ones who catch up with natives. 
Immigrants from regions which lagged behind in the aggregate such as “Middle East and 
North African” (MENA) and “Other African” countries, still perform considerably worse than 
natives even when they become long term residents. 
Comparing long-term immigrants under the two criteria – CoB and CoC - makes it explicit 
how the citizenship criteria might lead to wider employment gaps with natives by lowering 
the immigrants’ employment rates, as compared to the same gaps measured under the 
CoB criterion. It is important to select long-term immigrants as, within this group, 
immigrants are more likely to meet the criteria for naturalisation19. Thus, we should expect 
gaps between criteria to be larger under the long-term than recent immigrants. Indeed, 
in 2015, there were approximately 10 percentage points of difference between the two 
criteria for long-term immigrants from the ‘Other Africa’ and ‘North Africa and the Middle 
East’, nearly twice as much as the difference between the two criteria for recent 
immigrants. On the other hand, differences between the two criteria were not as 
pronounced for long-term immigrants from other regions. First, this points to different 
citizenship rewards in terms of integration into labour markets depending on the region of 
citizenship. Second, and methodologically, this highlights the importance of carefully 
selecting the relevant criteria when studying immigrants’ employment rates.  
Similarly to naturalisation, the length of residency offers varying gains to immigrants in 
terms of labour market integration according to the region of birth/citizenship. Figures 8 
and 9 show that the smallest differences between long-term and recent immigrants is for 
North America and Australia (7-8 percentage points change under both criteria). 
Performance of immigrants from other European countries, Latin America, and MENA 
countries feature changes in the region of 15 percentage points, while for East and South 
Asia and Africa gains exceed 20 percentage points under the citizenship criterion.  
In policy terms, the condition of immigrants from MENA countries might pose a particular 
challenge for the sheer size of the foreign resident population. 
                                           
19 Criteria for acquiring citizenship vary across Member States. For an overview, see 
http://www.mipex.eu/access-nationality.  
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Figure 4. Employment Rates by length of residence, CoB Criterion, 2008 and 2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability 
18 
Figure 5. Employment Rates by length of residence, CoC Criterion, 2008 and 2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 6. Differentials in employment rate gaps, CoB criterion, 2015-2008. 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 7. Differentials in employment rate gaps, CoC criterion, 2015-2008. 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability 
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Figure 8. Recent Immigrants' Employment Rates by CoB and CoC criteria, 2008-2015. 
  
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Germany and Malta under CoB criterion. The sample does not contain data on Malta under CoC criterion. 
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Figure 9. Long-term Immigrants' Employment Rates by CoB and CoC criteria, 2008-2015. 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Germany and Malta under CoB criterion. The sample does not contain data on Malta under CoC criterion. 
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3.2 Education and skills 
Besides length of residence, most of studies 
focus on education as one of the main 
determinants of immigrants’ integration 
outcomes in the labour markets. In this 
subsection, we consider both the formal level 
of education as well as skills such as language, 
numerical, literacy, and digital skills. 
Information on skills is drawn from various 
sources (EU LFS and OECD PIAAC), and the 
relationship is investigated only for 2015 due 
to data limitations.  
3.2.1 Formal education 
We start this overview by focusing on mean 
years of schooling20, one of the most 
commonly used ways to express differences in 
education levels. Figure 10 plots the gaps in 
educational attainment between natives and 
immigrants on the x-axis against the gaps in 
employment rates on the y-axis.  
If we expect education and employment to go 
hand in hand - meaning the more (less) 
education, the better (worse) the employment 
rates -, then countries would tend to cluster 
either in the top-right panel, or in the bottom-
left one. Indeed, this is the case for the larger 
number of countries. However, some countries 
represent an exception and fall in the upper left 
panel (immigrants have lower employment 
rates than natives but higher education: e.g. in 
Figure 10, left-hand panel, Poland, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, Ireland) and bottom 
right panel (immigrants have higher 
employment rates than natives but lower 
education: e.g. Figure 10, left-hand panel, 
Spain, Slovenia, Italy, and Greece).  
The results of Ireland, Luxembourg, and the 
UK should be considered in light of the fact that 
these are the only EU countries where the 
EU2020 goal of reaching 40% of the 30-34 
cohort with tertiary education has been 
attained (OECD and EU 2015: 301). In such a 
highly specialised labour market, immigrants 
with high educational level might face a higher 
competition in finding a job. On the other hand, 
in Southern countries such as Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, well over half of migrants 
                                           
20 The correspondence between ISCED 1997 and ISCED 2011 levels was implemented following UNESCO-UIS 
(2012) http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/international-standard-classification-of-
education-isced-2011-en.pdf. The conversion of level of education into mean years of schooling was carried 
out using OECD (2013) http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/pisa-2012-
results-excellence-through-equity-volume-ii/pisa-2012-technical-background_9789264201132-11-
en#.Wd4sPVu0MdU#page4  
Education is regarded as a key factor to 
explain not only immigrants’ initial 
occupations, but also the chances of seeing 
that status changed for the better (Benton et 
al. 2014: 5; European Commission 2016b: 
21). A recent study found that the probability 
of being unemployed or inactive was inversely 
related to the level of education (Gorodzeisky 
and Semyonov 2017, 11). Besides the 
baseline observation that higher level of 
educational achievements are associated with 
positive labour market outcomes (Algan et al. 
2010, 13), there are some migration-related 
specificities in the relationship between 
education and employment.   In broad terms, 
adult immigrants arrive in the host country 
after completing their education, which means 
that recognition of foreign diplomas becomes 
crucial for their chances not only of 
employment, but also to avoid down-skilling. 
For young immigrants and immigrants’ 
offspring the main factor to be taken into 
account in the relationship between education 
and labour market integration is schooling 
quality (Chiswick and Miller 2015, 1336). The 
relationship between education and labour 
market integration outcomes is not 
necessarily linear. Recent research on Sweden 
has shown that having ‘at least a three-year 
secondary education is essential for migrants´ 
employment success’. However, advancing in 
education beyond this level ‘does not, on 
average, improve migrants’ employment 
levels’ (Luik et al. 2016: 16).  
A key element for positive labour market 
integration is related to acquiring an 
educational qualification in the host country. 
In a recent contribution focusing on refugees 
in the Netherlands (Bakker et al. 2017), the 
employment rate gap between refugees who 
had a Dutch diploma and those who did not 
was about 20 percentage points after 6 years 
of access and widened over time. OECD study 
has also emphasised that immigrants with 
foreign education have lower return to their 
education in terms of employment level but 
also employment quality (educational 
mismatch) than immigrants with domestic 
qualifications. Moreover, the formal 
recognition of migrant’s foreign qualification 
by the host country improves migrant’s 
employment prospect regardless of migration 
and educational background of the immigrant 
(OECD 2017) 
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are ‘low-educated’ according to OECD classification of educational attainment (OECD and 
EU 2015: 319). This is connected to the fact that these countries feature large ‘low-status 
job segments’ which attracts immigrants (Fleischmann and Dronkers 2010: 350).  
While we can notice several clusters of countries in 2008 (Figure 10, left-hand panel), 
these groups have become somehow more polarised in 2015 (Figure 10, right-hand panel). 
This is the case for most of countries in the top left corner, where either education or 
employment gaps between natives and immigrants have increased for France, Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The bottom right cluster composed by 
Italy, Greece, Spain, and Slovenia has moved significantly upward on the employment 
axis, meaning that employment gaps have shrunk. In 2015, the group split in two parts, 
with Italy and Greece still showing small and negative employment gaps (meaning natives 
with lower employment rates but higher education), while Spain and Slovenia overturned 
their 2008 condition to have natives with higher employment rates. In the upper left 
corner, immigrants in the UK in 2015 showed higher average education as compared to 
2008, while in Ireland the educational gap between immigrants and natives decreased. In 
short, the graph neatly delineates four possible groups of countries, according to the level 
of employment and education. Comparing this clustering with the OECD country 
classification used in section 3, it is evident the extent to which immigrants in nearly ‘all 
long-standing destination countries’ display very similar features as those in ‘humanitarian 
migration countries’. In other words, immigrants who are on average more educated than 
natives have lower employment rates than natives not only in ‘long-standing destinations’ 
such as the UK and Luxembourg, but in ‘recent destination’ ones too such as Ireland and 
several others Baltic countries.  
Furthermore, comparing the CoB and CoC criteria we can notice that, overall, employment 
rate gaps become more pronounced across countries (with few exceptions such as Greece) 
(Figure 11). This is also true for the clusters of countries highlighted before. Again, the 
polarisation trend over time is accentuated – in line with expectations – if we consider 
these gaps under the citizenship criteria.  
One way to investigate the reasons for these divergences in the relationships between 
education and employment rates21 is to look at the regions of birth/citizenship of the 
migrant population across EU Member States (Figures 12-13). Our results for both 2008 
and 2015 show that immigrants with basic level of education from all regions, except North 
Africa and the Middle East, had higher employment rates than natives. However, the 
opposite is true when observing the ‘upper-secondary’ and ‘post-secondary non-tertiary 
education’. Indeed, in 2015 natives had higher employment rates than immigrants coming 
from all origin regions. Such distance between natives and immigrants is further 
accentuated in the case of ‘tertiary education’. 
Breaking down employment rates by both education level and regions of birth/citizenship 
highlights the gains accrued by immigrants from regions featuring very low employment 
rates in Europe, such as from MENA and African region (see Figures 12 and 13). The gains 
for immigrants from MENA countries are approximately 14 percentage points, while for 
African immigrants and Latin America they are slightly less than 10 percentage points. 
Having said that, tertiary-educated immigrants from MENA region continue to face a 
significant gap as compared to natives with the same educational attainment (about 20 
percentage points).  
Figure 12 and 13 also show that having a higher education might be less conducive to 
higher employment rates for immigrants as compared to natives. Similarly to what the 
literature has recently suggested (Luik et al. 2016), the gap between natives with tertiary 
                                           
21 In this case, education level was measured on a three-category scale: 1) basic education corresponding to less 
than primary, primary and lower secondary education (ISCED 2011 levels 0-2); 2) Upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 2011 levels 3 and 4); Tertiary education (ISCED 2011 levels 
5-8).  The correspondence between ISCED 1997 and ISCED 2011 levels was implemented following UNESCO-
UIS (2012) http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/international-standard-classification-of-
education-isced-2011-en.pdf 
25 
educational attainment and immigrants from all other countries, and from the MENA region 
in particular, are very high.  
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Figure 10. Years of Education and Employment Gap, CoB Criterion, 2008 and 2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 11. Years of Education and Employment Gap, CoC Criterion, 2008 and 2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 12. Employment Rates by education level and CoB, 2008 and 2015 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Germany and Malta. 
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Figure 13. Employment Rates by level of education and CoC, 2008 and 2015 
   
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS data, 2017. 
Note: The sample does not contain data on Malta. 
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3.2.2 Language skills 
We measured language skills based on the 2014 EU LFS 
ad hoc module on the Labour market situation of migrants 
and their immediate descendants. In this ad hoc module, 
migrants self-assessed the degree of command of the main 
host country language on a four-point scale ranging from 
‘Beginner or less skills’ up to ‘Language is mother tongue’. 
Here, to capture language skills, we took the share of 
immigrants who reported having basic knowledge of the 
host country language. The expected relationship between 
language proficiency and labour market integration should 
graphically translate in a cluster of countries (dots) located 
far away from the y-line and with positive employment 
gaps (i.e. natives have higher employment rates than 
immigrants), and another cluster very close to the y-axis 
and with negative gaps. This is exactly what the scatterplot 
in Figure 14 shows. The higher the share of non-EU born or 
non-EU citizens with basic language skills (e.g. Belgium, 
Finland, Sweden), the more difficult the access to the 
labour market as compared to natives, thus the wider the 
gap in employment rates. This is a trend that will 
consistently emerge in all graphs related to skills.  
Finally, the language skills-employment relationship offers 
only a partial support to the OECD country classification 
discussed in section 3. Indeed, in the top-right corner we 
can see countries belonging to the humanitarian migration 
(Finland, Sweden) as well as long-standing destination 
such as Austria, Belgium, and France (and Germany under 
the citizenship criterion). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a wide consensus in 
the scientific literature that 
equipping all workers – 
natives or migrants - with 
right skills positively affects 
workers’ productivity as well 
as worker’s employment 
outcomes (Kierzenkowski, 
Paciorek and G. Fulop, 2016). 
Focusing on migrant’s skills in 
specific, a wealth of studies 
indicate language proficiency 
as key to integration, with 
sizable effects on immigrants’ 
earnings (Chiswick and Miller 
2015, 1331–32; Hatton 2014, 
44). In this sense, language 
proficiency is regarded as a 
crucial human capital asset 
which ‘fosters social and 
economic integration’, leading 
to higher employment 
chances and earnings 
potential (Chiswick and Miller 
2015, 1331). Here, the bulk of 
evidence is consistent across 
several studies focusing on 
countries as diverse as, inter 
alia, the UK, Germany, and 
Spain (Chiswick and Miller 
2015, 1332).  
Himmler and Jaeckle (2014) 
also find that differences in 
gaps in literacy skills between 
migrants and natives impact 
migrant-native wage gaps. In 
addition, Lupiañez, 
Codagnone and Dalet (2015) 
find that ICT skills positively 
affect the employability of 
migrants. 
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Figure 14. Language skills (2014) and Employment gap, CoB and CoC (2015) 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS, 2017. 
Note: Figures excludes countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability22. 
                                           
22 In the Annex, we replicated with all Member States for which data was available (Figure 25). Figure 14 does not contain two outliers (Cyprus and Estonia) which significantly 
enlarge the scale and consequently obfuscates the general relationship between the two variables.   
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3.2.3 Numerical and literacy skills 
This section considers the relationship between employment gaps and gaps in numeracy 
and literacy skills, the latter measured using the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC) data. 
The relationships between employment gap and numerical and literacy skills is evident 
from Figure 15, and it becomes neater under the citizenship criteria. Three clusters of 
countries can be detected: 
- Greece, Lithuania, Italy, Slovakia, Czech Republic, and Cyprus, where the difference 
between immigrants and natives is minimal if not negative (meaning that 
immigrants have better numeracy and literacy skills than natives), leading to better 
employment outcomes for immigrants as compared to natives. 
- Estonia, Ireland, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK, which have an intermediate position 
(particularly in the case of numerical skills), where relatively small gaps result in 
employment rates gaps ranging between 2 to 8 percentage points.  
- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, where 
large gaps in skills translate in large employment gaps. This group of Member States 
exactly coincides with the upper left group of countries in Figure 10, whereas there 
is no exact matching with the other two groups above. Within this group, it is useful 
to single out the ‘destination countries with significant recent and humanitarian 
migration (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden)’, to highlight a possible policy 
implication of access policies. As the OECD highlighted, the main channel of entries 
for these countries have been family reunification and humanitarian channels.  
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Figure 15. Numerical and literacy skills and employment gap, CoB criterion, 2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and PIAAC, 2017. 
Note: Figures excludes countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability
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3.2.4 Digital skills 
Finally, in the overview of the relationship between migrant’s skills and employment we 
have considered the Digital skills indicator23 developed by DG CONNECT and Eurostat. This 
indicator comprises 4 digital skills’ domains - namely information skills, communication 
skills, problem solving skills and software skills for content manipulation - and provides a 
4 point-scale of the level of overall digital skills. According to this scale, individuals are 
classified into a) individuals with “above basic” level of skills (“above basic” in all 4 
domains), b) individuals with a “basic” level of skills (at least “basic” in all 4 domains), c) 
individuals with “low” level of skills (missing some type of basic skills) and d) individuals 
with “no skills” (one or more “none” in one to three domains).  
In this report we have compared the share of migrant population having “low level of digital 
skills” to the share of native population with same skills. It should be considered however 
that, differently from language and numeracy and literacy skills which are general skills 
applied to all occupation, the extent of use of digital skills is linked to certain types of 
occupation.  
Figure 16 shows that when there is a larger proportion of immigrants with low digital skills 
as compared to the share of natives with same skills, immigrants tend to have better labour 
market integration as compared to natives (as measured by employment rates). A future 
hypothesis that can be tested is whether immigrants in this latter group of countries are 
carrying out tasks which do not entail an elevated level of competence in digital skills. 
 
                                           
23 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/new-comprehensive-digital-skills-indicator 
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Figure 16. Digital skills and Employment gaps, CoB and CoC criteria, 2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of Eurostat [isoc_sk_dskl_i] Last update: 26-04-2017.  
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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4 Active labour market policies 
4.1.1 Policies 
This section examines the extent to which active 
labour market policies are associated with 
immigrants’ employment rates. Even though 
long-term unemployment is usually used as the 
main indicator of the efficacy of active labour 
market policies, and particularly so after the 
2007/08 crisis, here we would like to show how 
investing on these policies might be related to 
labour market integration overall, as measured 
by employment rates. The objective of active 
labour market policies ‘is to increase the 
employment opportunities for job seekers and to 
improve matching between jobs (vacancies) and 
workers (i.e. the unemployed)’24. 
Eurostat stores data on three distinct types of 
labour market policy interventions, namely 
services, measures, and supports. The following 
definitions are taken from Eurostat explanatory 
notes (metadata25) on these interventions:  
a) LMP services cover all services and 
activities of the Public Employment 
Services (PES) together with any other 
publicly funded services for jobseekers. 
i. Labour market services  
b) LMP measures cover interventions that 
provide temporary support for groups 
that are disadvantaged in the labour 
market and which aim at activating the 
unemployed, helping people move from 
involuntary inactivity into employment, or 
maintaining the jobs of persons 
threatened by unemployment.  
ii. Training 
iii. Employment incentives 
iv. Supported employment and 
rehabilitation 
v. Direct job creation 
vi. Start-up incentives  
c) LMP supports cover financial assistance 
that aims to compensate individuals for 
loss of wage or salary and support them 
during job-search (i.e. mostly 
unemployment benefits) or which facilitates early retirement. 
vii. Out-of-work income maintenance and support 
viii. Early retirement 
 
                                           
24https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-semester_thematic-factsheet_active-labour-market-
policies_en.pdf (accessed on 09/10/2017). 
25 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/lmp_esms.htm (accessed on 09/10/2017).  
The role of labour market institutions and 
(active and passive) policies on general 
labour market dynamics has been widely 
debated in recent times (OECD 2015: 105–
166), and some of these discussions have 
also touched upon the issue of labour 
market integration of migrants. 
In the domain of labour market policies, 
Butschek and Walter have recently 
reviewed the effect of active labour market 
policies on immigrants’ employment rates 
drawing on a survey of 33 evaluation 
studies. Focusing mainly on short –term 
effects of these policies, they found that 
among four main typologies of such 
policies in place in Europe – i.e.  training, 
job search assistance, subsidised public 
sector employment, wage subsidies – only 
the latter was consistently effective across 
all studies surveyed (Butschek and Walter 
2014).  
Regarding the Employment protection 
legislation (EPL), the academic literature 
has provided mixed evidence  in relation to 
the hypothesis that the more stringent the 
EPL,  the highest the ‘effect of statistical 
discrimination and the penalty of an 
outsider status [e.g. immigrants] in the 
labour market that immigrants are likely to 
experience’ (Fleischmann and Dronkers 
2010, 350; Migali 2017). Benton et al., on 
other side, concluded that short-term 
contracts and low regulatory barriers in EU 
countries favours early entry of immigrants 
into the labour market (Benton, Fratzke 
and Sumpton 2014, 16) 
A recent contribution points also to the 
importance of the level of labour market 
protection for acquisition of skills, which 
are in turn so relevant for immigrants’ 
employment outcomes (as shown in the 
previous subsection). Levels et al. have 
noticed that ‘protective labour markets’ are  
associated with literacy and numeracy gaps 
(Levels, Dronkers, and Jencks 2017, 18–
19). 
LABOUR MARKET REGULATIONS 
AND POLICIES & LABOUR MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
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It should be borne in mind that these labour market policy interventions usually do not 
target in specific the foreign-born or foreign citizens group as such, but are primarily 
directed at the entire working-age population and in specific those ‘to whom it is possible 
to apply the principle of mutual obligation, while groups not entitled to benefits (e.g. due 
to contribution conditions or means tests) are entitled to basic services’ (OECD 2015: 115). 
Nevertheless, there are some exceptions such as Denmark which has a mandatory 
integration programme specifically targeting recent migrants receiving social benefits 
(OECD 2015: 115). 
The general impression emerging from Figures 18-23 is that countries that feature high 
positive employment gaps have been devoting at the same time relatively higher shares 
of their GDPs to active labour market policies. Although it is not possible to distinguish the 
part of the ALMPs that immigrants benefit from, it is also true that to the extent to which 
these policies embrace both natives and immigrants, they could help in reducing the 
employment gaps that have been highlighted in this report. At the same time, this 
relationship could be interpreted also in the opposite direction: the immigrant’s residential 
choice is not random as they tend to locate in more rich destinations, that is those with a 
higher wage differential with the receiving countries. In specific, in the European case these 
destinations tend to correspond to countries dedicating larger shares of their GDP for 
ALMPs. 
As a note of caution, it is important to emphasise that these graphs aim at tentatively 
investigate, through descriptive statistics, whether any preliminary and meaningful 
relationships could be traced between these two variables. Only more complex inferential 
statistical techniques that aim at testing the causality entailed in this relationship while 
controlling for other intervening variables could offer a more comprehensive picture on the 
underlying mechanisms connecting active labour market policies and employment gaps. 
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Figure 17. LMP «services» and Employment gap, CoB criterion, 2008-2015 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and Eurostat (DG EMPL), 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 18. LMP «services» and Employment gap, CoC criterion, 2008-2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and Eurostat (DG EMPL), 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 19. LMP «measures» and employment gap, CoB criterion, 2008-2015 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and Eurostat (DG EMPL), 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 20. LMP «measures» and employment gap, CoC criterion, 2008-2015 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and Eurostat (DG EMPL), 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 21. LMP «supports» and employment gap, CoB criterion, 2008-2015 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and Eurostat (DG EMPL), 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability. 
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Figure 22. LMP «supports» and employment gap, CoC criterion, 2008-2015 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of EU LFS and Eurostat (DG EMPL), 2017. 
Note: Figures exclude countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability.
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5 Conclusions 
This report has looked at the intensity and variation of employment rate gaps between 
natives and immigrants in EU28 between 2008 and 2015. The main findings are: 
- Employment gaps vary widely in intensity in the period considered, ranging from 
30.9 percentage points in Sweden in 2012 (immigrants having lower employment 
rates than natives), to -16.1 in Slovakia in 2015 (immigrants having higher 
employment rates). For several countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, and Sweden), these gaps are remarkably stable. 
Consequently, there is little evidence that the large gaps recorded in this report for 
this set of Member States are closing. 
- We can identify clusters of countries across all our analysis (albeit not exactly 
overlapping with OECD country clusters). This confirms that the EU approach to 
integration, which has historically eschewed a one-size-fits-all approach in favour 
of more tailor-made policy solutions, is correct.  
- There are substantial differences in integration outcomes across regions of 
birth/citizenship, even when breaking down the data by education, and these 
differences persist through time. 
- There are also significant differences between recent- and long-term immigrants, 
highlighting the importance of the length of residence for immigrants’ 
integration. Again, the length of residence is associated with varying results in 
terms of immigrants’ integration outcomes depending on the regions of 
birth/citizenship and education.  
- Regarding education and skills, the findings largely confirm the expectations of a 
positive association between these factors and labour market integration. In other 
words, countries with higher gaps between natives and immigrants’ skills also 
feature large employment gaps. 
- Comparing employment rates by educational levels also reveals that, particularly 
for some regions of origin, the economic return in terms of employment rates of 
achieving tertiary education for immigrants is lower than natives. 
This report has provided an exploration of employment rate gaps between natives and 
immigrants. There are at least two main research avenues ahead. First, the analysis could 
be further developed from descriptive to inferential, developing models to quantitatively 
estimate the relationships between the determinants analysed here and employment rates. 
Second, employment rates provide only some pieces of the larger and more complex puzzle 
of immigrants’ integration in the labour markets. The natural step forward would be to 
move from the quantity of work to the quality of work carried out by immigrants. To do 
that, this report should be coupled with, at least, other analysis of immigrants’ earning and 
occupational status.  
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Annexes 
Figure 23. Trends in employment rate gaps, CoB criteria, 2006-2016 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of Eurostat data, 2017. 
Note: Figures excludes countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability 
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Figure 24. Trends in employment rate gaps, CoC criterion, 2006-2016 
 
Source: KCMD elaborations of Eurostat data, 2017. 
Note: Figures excludes countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability 
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Figure 25. Language skills (2014) and Employment gap, CoB and CoC (2015) 
  
Source: KCMD elaborations of Eurostat data, 2017. 
Note: Figures excludes countries for which the data is missing or has low reliability 
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